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MTA seminar - "Nuclear Platform Diversification: A New Dataset" with David Arceneaux - Shared screen with speaker view
Matthew Bunn
40:56
So is there a category that is neither strategic nor tactical? (Various US systems were >500 km but not able to hit Moscow.)
Francesca Giovannini
52:16
we will open soon for questions and comments
Rebecca Gibbons
59:34
You too Tom!
Ali Ahmad
01:00:13
Im sorry, but i need to drop off. This is a really interesting work, David. Congrats
Paul Schulte
01:03:24
Is there a significant but hidden variable here- of patron nuclear warhead numbers : adversary nuclear numbers (ie relative strategic superiority or its absence )? This presumably psychologically salient ratio might often be associated with diversity of delivery systems but would not be identical with platform diversification.
Rebecca Gibbons
01:04:19
All nuke scholars need to change that then
Rebecca Gibbons
01:05:55
(in pol science)
paul alexander
01:12:16
Dennis Healey the British chap
William d'Ambruoso
01:14:39
Matt's point about the gap between deterring adversaries and reassuring allies gets at why I think this is a rather "easy" demonstration of the importance of platform diversification. But I think that it's okay to explore easier one(s) as a first cut for a research note.
John Holdren
01:20:02
Rebecca -- Yes, it's interesting (and dismaying) how language blunders persist and propagate. (Webster is completely clear on penetrative versus penetrable.) Cheers, John
Matthew Bunn
01:27:12
And yet, extended deterrence has worked for decades, which is puzzling. I think it works because adversaries understand the fog of war: if you get in a big fight with a U.S. ally, there’s some risk that things will get out of control one way or another (as they almost did in the Cuban Missile Crisis).
Abolghasem Bayyenat
01:29:51
I don't think the model claims to capture all that matters to deterrence ; credibility is another major independent variable that needs to be factored in any analysis
William d'Ambruoso
01:33:15
Al's and Steve's comments run somewhat close to my question- Could it be that France and Israel were just some American or UK platform diversification away from forgoing the nuclear capabilities they developed? That's probably an unfair question because you are finding a marginal effect; just something to keep in mind from the more qualitative-minded among us going forward.
Hyun-Binn Cho
01:35:32
David, I enjoyed the talk very much. Great to see the progress you’ve made on the project!
Mailys Mangin
01:35:39
Thank you David for this very clear presentation and well structured design research!
William d'Ambruoso
01:35:43
Great work David!
Joo Yh
01:35:56
Thank you! :)